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Abstract
Both agency- and non-agency-based interpretations have been proposed to explain the strong positive
empirical relationship between corporate cash ﬂow and corporate investment. In this paper, we attempt
to distinguish between these diﬀerent interpretations using project-level data in the oil and gas industry.
The speciﬁc projects we consider are mineral exploration leases on tracts of land. The standard positive
relationship between investment and cash ﬂow holds for these projects, in that we ﬁnd that positive
shocks to residual cash ﬂow (netting out ﬁrm and time eﬀects) are associated with higher spending
on these projects. Interestingly, the increased investment comes from an increase in the price paid
per tract with little to no change in the total number of tracts or total acreage of land bought. The
positive association between price and cash ﬂow holds even after controlling for a set of tract and ﬁrm
characteristics that might be ex-ante related to expected return on a given tract. This data is most
useful, however, because we can directly observe the eventual productivity of the projects undertaken.
We ﬁnd that the variation in bid price induced by higher cash ﬂow is, if anything, negatively related
to tract productivity. More importantly, the overall number of productive tracts does not increase with
the cash ﬂow in the year these tracts were bought. In other words, while higher cash ﬂow is associated
with higher spending on these projects, higher cash ﬂow does not lead to higher revenues from these
projects. Combining this ﬁnding with the lack of a quantity response, we conclude that our results are
best described by an agency model where managers use cash ﬂow to simplify their job (or live a “quiet
life”) rather than “empire-build.”
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11 Introduction
In a variety of data sets, ﬁrm cash ﬂow has been found to predict capital expenditures much better than
standard measures of investment opportunities or cost of capital (Caballero 1999, Stein 2003). What can
explain this ﬁnding? Three main interpretations have been proposed. The ﬁrst, a mis-measurement (or
omitted variable) interpretation, argues that cash ﬂow proxies for investment opportunities. Under this
interpretation, greater cash ﬂow is simply correlated with the availability of proﬁtable investment projects
(Poterba 1988). The second, a ﬁnancing constraint interpretation, argues that added cash ﬂow gives
ﬁrms the resources to undertake proﬁtable projects that they otherwise could not (Fazarri, Hubbard and
Petersen, 1988). The third, an agency-based interpretation, argues that managers may dissipate “free”
cash ﬂow on wasteful investments for private gain (Jensen 1986).
Much of the theoretical and empirical debate surrounding this question has focused on the mis-
measurement interpretation, reaching rather mixed conclusions so far. Several papers have shown that
Tobin’s Q may indeed be a poor proxy for the true fundamental determinants of a ﬁrm’s investment op-
portunities and that cash ﬂow may contain valuable information about such opportunities (see for Erickson
and Whited 2000 or Alti 2003). Yet, other papers have shown that capital expenditures are also signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀected by increases in cash ﬂow that are plausibly exogenous to changes in investment opportunities
(Lamont 1997, Shin and Stultz 1998, Rauh 2004), thereby seriously undermining a pure mis-measurement
interpretation.
Assuming there is indeed some causal link between cash ﬂow and investment, it is still an open ques-
tion whether the additional capital expenditures generated by greater cash ﬂow are proﬁtable (ﬁnancing
constraint interpretation) or wasteful (agency interpretation).1 Data constraints have so far prevented
researchers from directly tackling this question. Indeed, most of the prior research relies on balance-sheet
data, which does not include information on the speciﬁc projects undertaken when ﬁrms experience a
positive shock to their cash ﬂow, much less on the outcome of these projects.
In this paper, we re-examine the investment-cash ﬂow relationship in a data set where both individual
investment projects but also the outcome of these projects can be evaluated. The speciﬁc investment
projects we focus on are mineral exploration leases. The federal government routinely auctions oﬀ explo-
ration rights to oﬀshore tracts. Firms bid on these tracts in order to have exclusive rights to explore them
and, in the case oil, gas or other minerals are found, extract resources from them. The data set details
1Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) tested the ﬁnancing constraint interpretation by comparing investment-cash ﬂow
sensitivities across groups of ﬁrms that they deﬁne as ex ante more or less ﬁnancially constrained. Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
started a long debate in the literature on the theoretical and empirical validity of this exercise. Rauh (2004) ﬁnds more robust
support for a ﬁnancing constraint interpretation when relying on exogenous shock to cash ﬂow.
2for each tract the amount bid by all bidding ﬁrms (both winners and losers), the identity of these bidding
ﬁrms, the exact timing of the bid (month and year), and numerous tract-level characteristics that may be
predictive of the tract’s eventual productivity. Most importantly, we also observe for each tract whether
or not it was eventually found productive and, for a subset of the productive tracts, the exact quantity of
minerals extracted. The structure of the data therefore allows to identify the marginal project undertaken
when cash ﬂow increases, as well as to track eventual return on this marginal project.
We ﬁrst establish that the standard investment-cash ﬂow relationship holds in this data set. In a
panel regression that includes both ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects, we show that higher cash ﬂow is associated
with higher total spending on oil and gas leases. 2 Interestingly, this positive relationship between total
expenditures and cash ﬂow is not driven by a quantity response. Positive shocks to cash ﬂow are not
associated with ﬁrms buying more tracts or more acreage of land. Instead, the relationship between total
expenditures and cash ﬂow is driven by a price response. Firms bid more for each acre of land as their
cash ﬂow increases. The bid price-cash ﬂow relationship is robust to controlling for a set of physical tract
characteristics that are observable by all bidding ﬁrms prior to the auction. More tellingly, the bid price-
cash ﬂow relationship estimated on the set of winning bids is also robust to controlling for the second
highest bid in the auction.
We then study the productivity of the tracts that are bought when residual cash ﬂow is greater. Our
basic measure of productivity is whether or not a tract is declared productive before the lease expiration
date, i.e. whether or not minerals are found in the tract. While previous papers have documented that a
higher bid price positively predicts whether a given tract will eventually be found productive (see Hendricks
and Porter 1996), we ﬁnd that cash ﬂow-induced increases in bid price are, if anything, negatively related to
eventual productivity. More importantly, in a simple panel regression that controls for ﬁrm and year ﬁxed
eﬀects, we ﬁnd that the overall number of productive tracts does not increase with a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow in the
year these tracts were bought. In other words, while we establish that higher cash ﬂow is associated with
higher spending on these projects, higher cash ﬂow is not associated with a larger number of productive
projects. We also show that this result is not an artifact of focusing on the probability of success as a
return measure. Focusing on a subset of productive tracts for which we have detailed information on the
amount of resources extracted, we ﬁnd no evidence that productive tracts bought when cash ﬂow is high
systematically generate more resources. These ﬁndings contradict a proﬁt maximization-based explanation
2The inclusion of year ﬁxed eﬀects means that we are not simply picking up on an industry wide phenomenon, such as all
ﬁrms bidding more when the price of oil increases. The inclusion of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects means that we are not simply picking
up on other time-invariant ﬁrm characteristics that are systematically correlated with average diﬀerences in cash ﬂow across
ﬁrms.
3for the investment-cash ﬂow relationship in this data set. Instead, they are consistent with a free cash ﬂow
interpretation.3
Many industry observers perceive that the oil industry experienced large improvements in corporate
governance in the 1980s. Increases in both takeover activity and in the threat of takeovers are thought to
have reduced some of the managerial misbehavior posited by the free cash ﬂow view. We ﬁnd that bid
prices are sensitive to cash ﬂow throughout the sample period (mid 1960s to late 1990s). But in the later
years of our sample (post-1985), the proﬁtability of tracts bought when cash ﬂow is high does improve.
This at least matches the prior belief of an improvement in corporate governance.4
While our results support a free cash ﬂow model of bidders’ behavior (especially prior to the mid
1980s), there is one important caveat. Free cash ﬂow models often also assume that managers seek to build
empires (Jensen 1986). Yet, in our data, we ﬁnd no evidence that bidders attempt to increase the scale of
their operations when cash ﬂow increases: they are not bidding on more tracts or more total acreages of
land. Instead, they simply appear to be making worse decisions and dissipating cash through higher bid
prices. In this sense, our results appear to be most consistent with “quiet life” models of free cash ﬂow, in
which managers use cash on hand to make their job easier (Hicks 1935, Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003).
One simple model that would ﬁt the facts uncovered in our empirical analysis would involve a trickling
down of extra cash ﬂow through the organizational hierarchy. When cash ﬂow is high, top management
may increase investment budgets throughout the ﬁrm, either explicitly or by being more lenient towards
budgetary requests. This increased budget gives lower-level management the ability to spend cash to make
their jobs easier. Overpaying for leases can occur either because these lower-level managers want to avoid
the private costs of generating information about the tracts or the private costs of ﬁnding new tracts if
their earlier bids fail.5
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the industry.
We describe the data in Section 3. Section 4 proposes a simple theoretical framework aimed at guiding
the interpretation of the empirical analysis. Our main ﬁndings are presented in Section 5. We address
possible alternative interpretations in Section 6.1. Section 6.2 discusses how our ﬁndings might or might
not generalize to other industrial contexts. We conclude in Section 7.
3As we will discuss in more details below, diminishing returns cannot explain why the overall number of productive leases
fail to rise with cash ﬂow.
4Though of course this change could be driven by many other aggregate time shocks, such as changes in exploration
technology.
5As we discuss in Section 6.2, these results may therefore more directly generalize to other investment projects decided
upon lower down in the organizational hierarchy.
42 Description of Industry Context
Since 1954, the U.S. Department of Interior has been auctioning oﬀ leases that give mineral exploration
rights to tracts of federal land. These tracts are located in Alaska, oﬀshore in the Paciﬁc and oﬀshore in
the Gulf of Mexico. For data availability reasons, we will focus in this paper on sales in the Gulf of Mexico.
Each sale is a simultaneous auction of typically more than a hundred tracts and there are several sales
taking place each year. The auction format is ﬁrst-price, sealed bid. The highest bidder for each tract is
usually awarded the lease in exchange for the amount bid, unless the government deemed the amount bid
as insuﬃcient. These leases represent fairly large investment projects. The average lease in our sample is
sold for $12.5 million dollars (in 2000 dollars). Firms who bid on these tracts vary dramatically in size,
from subdivisions of large publicly traded ﬁrms to small partnerships bidding on a couple of tracts every
few years.
In order to inform their bidding decisions, ﬁrm often conduct seismic surveys or purchase such surveys
from geophysical companies. Each ﬁrm uses this survey data to identify geologically attractive tracts and
then conducts an in-depth evaluation of these tracts (Hendricks, Pinske and Porter 2003). In addition,
because tracts located within the same area are likely to share common geological features, ﬁrms can also
rely on the publicly observed successes or failures of previously auctioned nearby tracts. Finally, ﬁrms may
also have some private information if they own some nearby successful tracts.6
When a ﬁrm wins a tract, it can explore the tract for the length of the lease (typically ﬁve years).
A rent, typically of $3 per acre, is paid by the ﬁrm each year of the lease until discovery of minerals or
until the lease expires. Exploration typically involves drilling boreholes and testing for presence of gas,
oil, or other minerals. If the lease expires without the discovery of any major oil and/or gas reserves, the
government regains ownership of the tract. If minerals are discovered before the expiration date, the lease
is automatically renewed for as long as the tract is producing minerals. So exploration leases eﬀectively give
monopoly rights to extraction as well. Once production begins, the government receives a ﬁxed fraction
of production revenues (typically 16.7 percent) as a royalty payment. Royalty rate, rental rates and lease
length are known prior to bidding.
6As described below, ﬁrms typically have a ﬁve year window from purchase to report of any mineral ﬁndings or the lease
reverts to the government. Since such reports are public, this limits the time horizon in which ﬁrms can keep successes private.
53 Data
The Minerals Management Service (MMS) keeps detailed information on all leases auctioned oﬀ in the Gulf
of Mexico since 1954. For each lease, the data contain, among other things: complete bidding information
(all recorded bids with name of the bidding companies), tract characteristics (size, maximum and minimum
depth, location), contract characteristics (rental rate, royalty rate, length of lease), and whether or not the
lease ended up being found productive at the end of the exploration period.
We merge this lease-level information to ﬁrm-year balance sheet information from COMPUSTAT.
Because the MMS and COMPUSTAT do not share the same company identiﬁers, we merge the two data
sets by hand based on company names. One operational diﬃculty is the treatment of subsidiaries. Indeed,
large publicly traded oil companies often appear in the MMS data through fully or partly owned subsidiaries
that specialize in exploration activities. We use company directories (such as One Source) to match a given
subsidiary to its parent company. About 40 percent of all bids in the MMS data belong to privately held
stand-alone ﬁrms. Such ﬁrms are not covered in COMPUSTAT and therefore not included in our ﬁnal
sample. Also, while the MMS data is available from 1954 on, COMPUSTAT data only starts in 1963. Our
ﬁnal dataset covers about 120 ﬁrms over the 1963-1999 period.
We use COMPUSTAT to measure cash ﬂow and investment opportunities for the ﬁrms in our sample.
We deﬁne cash ﬂow as the sum of earnings before extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT item 18) and
depreciation (item 14); we deﬂate this measure by capital, which is measured as net property, plant and
equipment (item 8) at the beginning of the ﬁscal year. We measure average Tobin’s Q as the market value
of assets divided by the book value of assets (item 6). The market value of assets is deﬁned as the book
value of assets plus the market value of common equity less the sum of the book value of common equity
(item 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (item 74). We calculate average Tobin’s Q at the beginning of
the ﬁscal year. From COMPUSTAT, we also extract total capital expenditures for the ﬁrms in our sample
(item 128), which we deﬂate by net property, plant and equipment at the beginning of the ﬁscal year.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1. The unit of observation is a bid (placed by a given company
on a given lease). We present summary statistics for all bids (column 2) as well as for the sub-sample of
winning bids (column 3). The average size of a tract is about 5000 acres and the average bid price per acre
is $2,500 (in 2000 dollars). About 30 percent of the bids were on tracts that were later found productive.
Because we exclude smaller private bidders for lack of balance sheet data, the ﬁrms included in our ﬁnal
sample are very large. Total assets for the median ﬁrm is $2 billion (in 2000 dollars). Firms in our sample
6bid on average for 9 diﬀerent tracts every year and win on average 7.7 We calculated that expenditures
on these tracts represent on average about 5 percent of total capital expenditures for the ﬁrms included in
our sample.
3.1 Overall Investment
Since we are focusing on a speciﬁc industry and speciﬁc type of investment projects, two preliminary
questions come to mind. First, do the ﬁrms in our sample display the usual positive correlation between
cash ﬂow and balance sheet capital expenditures? Second, how does spending on the leases that will be
the focus of our detailed project-level data relate to overall capital expenditures? We address the ﬁrst
question in Panel A of Table 2 and the second in Panel B of that table.
In column 1 of Panel A, we regress the logarithm of capital expenditures on the logarithm of cash ﬂow
for the panel of all ﬁrms ever present in our sample, whether or not this is a bidding year for these ﬁrms
or not.8 We further control for ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Also, in this table, as well as in all following
tables, standard errors are estimated allowing for correlation of the error term at the ﬁrm level.
We ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between total investment and cash ﬂow
for the ﬁrms in our sample. A 1 percent increase in cash ﬂow leads to .4 percent increase in capital
expenditures. In column 2, we further control for Tobin’s Q. We ﬁnd a positive relationship between
capital expenditures and Tobin’s Q. The inclusion of this additional control for investment opportunities
however barely alters the investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity estimated in column 1. In the remaining columns
of Panel A, we replicate the speciﬁcation of column 2 but only include those ﬁrm-year observations that
correspond to bidding years (column 3) or winning years (column 4) for a given ﬁrm. We obtain results
qualitatively similar to those in column 2 for these two unbalanced panels.
In Panel B of Table 2, we examine how bidding and spending on the leases covered in our project-level
data relates to balance sheet capital expenditures. In column 1, the dependent variable is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if a ﬁrm places at least one bid in that year. We regress this dummy variable on the logarithm
of total capital expenditures, further controlling for ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects. We ﬁnd a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant relationship. The same holds in column 2 where the dependent variable is now a
dummy variable that equals 1 if a ﬁrm wins at least one auction in that year. In the rest of Panel B, we
relate total amount bid (conditional on bidding on at least one lease in that year) and total amount spent
7Such high success rates raise questions of collusion, an issue we return to in Section 6.
8Similar results follow if we use a level-level rather than a logarithm-logarithm speciﬁcation. We however focus on a
logarithm-logarithm speciﬁcation throughout the paper since it ﬁts the data best. This results in us dropping the small
fraction of observations (about 4 percent) where cash ﬂow is negative.
7(conditional on winning at least one lease in that year) to total capital expenditures. Both total amount
bid and total amount spent are deﬂated by net property, pant and equipment at the beginning of the ﬁscal
year. A 1 percent increase in capital expenditures is associated with a .52 percent increase in the amount
bid (column 3) and a .45 percent increase in the amount spent (column 4) on oil and gas leases.
Whether the results we document below generalize to other industries or other types of investment
projects is of course an empirical question. But the ﬁndings in Table 2 suggests that we are at the very
least not focusing on a particularly atypical case. Panel A shows that ﬁrms in this industry display the
positive correlation between cash ﬂow and total capital expenditures that has been empirically observed
in other sectors of the economy. Panel B shows that the particular type of capital expenditures we are
focusing on co-moves with the other types of capital expenditures these ﬁrms undertake.
4 Framework
In order to guide the empirical work below, we present a simple model of investment. The goal of this
framework is not to elucidate optimal bidding behavior but instead to clarify what the diﬀerent theories
of the investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity would imply for the project-level data we study.
Whenever a ﬁrm wins a lease, the proﬁts generated by this single lease is deﬁned to be:
p(R − C) − I − E,
where p is the probability of ﬁnding minerals, R is the revenue generated by the lease (conditional on
ﬁnding minerals), C are production/extraction costs (conditional on ﬁnding minerals), I is the price paid
for the lease and E are exploration costs.
In principle, each of these variables may potentially depend on cash ﬂow, and we make two simplifying
assumptions in the empirical work below. First, we assume that production and extraction costs for a
given lease are not related to cash ﬂow. This assumption seems validated, at least anecdotally, by the
fact that extraction technologies are fairly uniform within sets of tracts sharing the same basic geological
features (depth, location) and within time periods, variables that we control for in the empirical analysis.9
By the same token, we assume that exploration costs do not vary with cash ﬂow.
9We directly investigated whether cash ﬂow relates to some physical characteristics of the tracts bid on that might be
associated with lower costs (such as tract depth). We found no evidence for this. Also, one may argue that, even holding
tract characteristics and year constant, costs may vary ﬁrm by ﬁrm based on the location of the tracts they have won in the
past. For example, a ﬁrm may have relatively lower costs on a tract if that ﬁrm is already exploring or producing in several
neighboring tracts. However, as we show in Table 7, we ﬁnd no systematic evidence that cash rich ﬁrms are more likely to bid
on tracts located in areas where they already have a strong presence.
8Second, we also assume for now that that the revenues generated by a given lease, conditional on the
lease being productive, are not related to cash ﬂow. Of course this needs not be the case. For example,
bidders with high cash ﬂow may bid on riskier projects. In practice, we will explicitly test this simplifying
assumption in the last part of the paper (for a subset of productive leases) and ﬁnd that this assumption
holds in the data.10
Bid price (I) and probability of success (p) are assumed to vary with cash ﬂow. We also assume that
the number of leases bought, which we denote N, vary with cash ﬂow.11 Because of diminishing returns,
we also assume that the probability of ﬁnding minerals on any one lease may change with the number of
leases bought. Given the assumptions above, we can now express proﬁt per lease and total proﬁts as:
π(CF) = p(CF,N)(R − C) − I(CF) − E
Π(CF) = N(CF)[p(CF)(R − C) − I(CF) − E]
Diﬀerentiating with respect to cash ﬂow shows how average and total lease proﬁts vary with cash ﬂow:








with pN ≤ 0, because of diminishing returns.
What do the diﬀerent theories of the investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity say about how these diﬀerent
variables respond to cash ﬂow? Table 3 provides a summary of these predictions. Obviously, all three
theories, by deﬁnition, predict that I ∗ N will increase with cash ﬂow.
Consider now how total proﬁts vary with cash ﬂow: ΠCF. Liquidity constraint and mis-measurement
theories assume proﬁt maximization and hence must imply that ΠCF ≥ 0: total proﬁts must rise with
cash ﬂow. Since expenditures are increasing with cash ﬂow, revenues must rise to oﬀset this increase. This
in turn implies within our framework that the total number of successes p ∗ N must rise with cash ﬂow.
Under the free cash ﬂow theory, however, proﬁt maximization is not assumed by deﬁnition. Consequently,
it is only under this theory that the total number of successes, p∗N, may not rise with cash ﬂow. In fact,
p ∗ N may even fall under that theory if cash-rich managers end up buying worse tracts on average.
10This assumption also ﬁts well with earlier work showing that, while bid price is a strong predictor of whether a given tract
will be productive, it is not very predictive of how much resources will be found, conditional on positive output. In other
words, while bidders seem able to somewhat predict whether a given lease will be productive or not, they ﬁnd it much harder
to predict its actual output.
11In this simpliﬁed framework, we assume tracts are homogenous and ﬁrms increase quantity by increasing number of leases.
In practice, of course, other dimensions such as tract size may vary with cash ﬂow. We will investigate this in detail in the
empirical section.
9Note that these predictions are only true for total proﬁts and total number of successes. Because of
diminishing returns, a drop in average proﬁt and average success rate as cash ﬂow increases could be
reconciled with all three theories. To see this, note that in equation (1), πCF could be negative if NCF is
positive, as pN is less or equal to zero due to diminishing returns.
In practice, we will empirically study each of the following factors. First, we will study the relationship
between total spending on leases (N∗I) and cash ﬂow (CF). This ﬁrst step is equivalent to the investment-
cash ﬂow regressions previously estimated with more standard capital expenditures data. Obviously, as
mentioned above, all three views of the investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity predict that I ∗ N increases with
cash ﬂow.
We will then decompose this total spending eﬀect into a quantity eﬀect (N) and a price eﬀect (I).12 A
study of the quantity response is relevant in at least two regards. First, as we discussed above, the proﬁt-
maximization and free cash ﬂow models have systematically diﬀerent implications for average proﬁt and
average success rate only in the absence of a quantity response. Indeed, without scale eﬀects (NCF ≈ 0),
proﬁt-maximization implies not only that total proﬁts but also that average proﬁt must rise with cash ﬂow.
A study of the quantity response is also interesting in its own right. If the presumption is that
higher cash ﬂow proxies for higher investment opportunities or eases liquidity constraints, then one would
intuitively expect a positive quantity response. In contrast, under the free cash ﬂow theory, the eﬀect
of cash ﬂow on number of leases bought depends purely on assumptions about managerial preferences.
While empire building theories might imply a positive quantity response, other theories (which we classify
together as “quiet life” theories) may imply no such response.13
Next, we will study how cash ﬂow aﬀects the likelihood of success for the average tract. As noted
earlier, average probability of success and average proﬁt can theoretically not increase with cash ﬂow in
all three models: because of diminishing returns in the proﬁt-maximization models, and also because of
mismanagement and/or bad project choice in the free cash ﬂow model. However, to preview on some our
results below, this average probability of success regressions will be theoretically informative because we
do not ﬁnd any quantity response.
Finally, to even more carefully diﬀerentiate between these diﬀerent theories, we will directly study
how total number of successes, N ∗ p, varies with cash ﬂow. As noted above, N ∗ p must increase with
cash ﬂow under the mis-measurement and liquidity constraints models. Otherwise, total proﬁts would also
12In practice, we will consider two alternative quantity measures: total number of leases and total acreage of land.
13Obviously, if one assumes that tracts vary in observable quality, then it is unclear what “quantity” means in this model.
Scale of operations could increase by simply buying fewer higher quality tracts. In fact, in the analysis below, we ﬁnd neither
evidence of a response on number of tracts bought nor evidence that higher cash ﬂow leads ﬁrms to bid on tracts that have
systematically better observable characteristics.
10be decreasing with cash ﬂow (as expenditures rise with cash ﬂow), contradicting the proﬁt maximization
assumption. Only under the agency-based free cash ﬂow model may N ∗p not be increasing with cash ﬂow.
5 Results
5.1 Total Bids and Cash Flow
In Table 4, we study the relationship between total lease expenditures and cash ﬂow. The ﬁrst two columns
focus on total amount bid in a given year by a given ﬁrm, conditional on bidding on at least one lease; the
last two columns focus on total amount won in given year by a given ﬁrm, conditional on winning at least
one lease. Total amount bid and total amount won are deﬂated by net property, plant and equipment at
the beginning of the ﬁscal year.14 Both lease expenditures and cash ﬂow are expressed in logarithms.
Each regression in Table 4 controls for Tobin’s Q, as well as ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The year ﬁxed
eﬀects allow us to net out any aggregate shocks that might be correlated with ﬁrm cash ﬂow and lease
expenditures, such as changes in the price of oil. Controlling for such year ﬁxed eﬀects is crucial since
oil price changes will likely aﬀect both ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow and the perceived proﬁtability of leases.15 The
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects net out any ﬁxed diﬀerences between ﬁrms in cash ﬂow and total lease expenditures. For
example, some ﬁrms may systematically have access to superior information, which could translate into
higher cash ﬂow and higher investment level. The inclusion of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects ensures that our estimates
are not driven by any such ﬁxed diﬀerences across ﬁrms. Finally, to account for any dependencies across
observations caused by serial correlation, standard errors are estimated allowing for correlation of the error
term at the ﬁrm-level.16
In columns 1 and 3, we ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between amount bid or
spent on oil and gas leases and cash ﬂow. The relationship is very similar in magnitude to that observed
for overall capital expenditures in Table 2. A 1 percent increase in cash ﬂow increases amount bid and
amount won by about .4 percent.
These regressions assume that A one percent change in cash ﬂow has a uniform eﬀect throughout the
cash ﬂow distribution. However, it is possible that a one percent change at the bottom of the cash ﬂow
distribution may diﬀerentially aﬀect expenditures than a one percent change at the top of that distribution.
We investigate such a possibility in columns 2 and 4 where we rely on a more ﬂexible functional form.
14In case of joint bidding, total amount bid and total amount won are computed based on the fraction of ownership of the
ﬁrm in the joint bid.
15When we move to the lease-level data below, we will also control for the monthly price of oil (in addition to the year ﬁxed
eﬀects) as we know the speciﬁc month a certain lease was auctioned oﬀ.
16See Bertrand, Duﬂo and Mullainathan 2004 for a simple discussion.
11Speciﬁcally, we “spline” the cash ﬂow variable and allow for diﬀerent investment-cash ﬂow sensitivities
at low cash ﬂow levels (below the 33rd percentile of the cash ﬂow distribution), medium cash ﬂow levels
(between 33rd and 66th percentile of the cash ﬂow distribution) and high cash ﬂow levels (above 66th
percentile of the cash ﬂow distribution).17
Interestingly, the greatest sensitivity of lease expenditures to cash ﬂow is in the middle cash ﬂow range.
In fact, there is no sensitivity in the low cash ﬂow range. Investment is positively related to cash ﬂow in
the high cash ﬂow range but the relationship is not precisely estimated.
In summary, the ﬁndings in Table 4 conﬁrm the positive relationship between lease expenditures and
cash ﬂow ((N ∗ I)CF ≥ 0). We now proceed to exploiting the project-level nature of our data to better
understand what drives this relationship.
5.2 Decomposition into Price and Quantity Eﬀects
What drives the observed positive relationship between cash ﬂow and total lease expenditures? Do cash-rich
ﬁrms bid on and win more leases or do they spend more per lease?
In Table 5, we propose to decompose the aggregate eﬀects in Table 4 into such quantity and price
margins. In Panel A, we use as dependent variables the average price per lease bid on (columns 1 and 2)
and the average price per lease won (columns 3 and 4). In Panel B, we use as dependent variables the
number of leases bid on (columns 1 and 2) and number of leases won (columns 3 and 4). In columns 1 and
3 of both panels, we estimate a linear regression model between cash ﬂow and these price and quantity
measures; in columns 2 and 4, we spline the cash ﬂow variable to allow for non-linearity, as described
above. The control variables included in all regressions, in addition to cash ﬂow, are Tobin’s Q, ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between cash ﬂow and number of leases
bid on or number of leases won (Panel B). The estimated coeﬃcients on cash ﬂow in columns 1 and 3,
while positive, are economically small and statistically insigniﬁcant. Only in the low cash ﬂow range does
it appear to be a positive, albeit weak, positive relationship between cash ﬂow and number of tracts bid
on or won (columns 2 and 4 of Panel B).
The sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow observed in Table 4 is solely driven by an increase in the
price per lease as cash ﬂow goes up (Panel A). When we allow for non-linearity in this price-cash ﬂow
relationship (columns 2 and 4), we ﬁnd that this price eﬀect is especially strong in the medium and high
cash ﬂow ranges. In fact, in the low cash ﬂow range, increases in cash ﬂow are not associated with higher
17We chose this speciﬁcation for simplicity. Allowing for more non-linearities in the functional form produces similar results.
12bid price per lease.
In regressions not reported here, we performed an alternative decomposition into quantity and price
eﬀects. Rather than using number of leases as the quantity measure, we used total acreage of land (either
bid on or won). We used average price per acre as the price measure in this alternative decomposition.
We found comparable results. In other words, there is no signiﬁcant relationship between acreages of land
bid on or won and cash ﬂow. Instead, the positive relationship between investment and cash ﬂow appears
solely driven by an increase in bid price per acre as cash ﬂow goes up.18
In summary, the results in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that ﬁrms bid and spend more on oil and gas
leases when their cash ﬂow increases. In fact, the investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity we observe for these
speciﬁc projects is quantitatively very similar to the overall investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity (as measured
from balance sheet data) for this subset of ﬁrms. Interestingly, though, we ﬁnd no evidence that this
investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity reﬂects an increase in the number of projects undertaken when cash ﬂow
rises, except maybe in the lowest cash ﬂow range. This apparent lack of a quantity response appears at
odds with a simple ﬁnancing constraint interpretation of the investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity. The lack of
a quantity response also appears at odds with a simple empire-building interpretation.19
5.3 Bid Price Per Acre and Cash Flow
In Table 6, we re-examine the relationship between bid price per acre and cash ﬂow. However, instead
of studying average price per acre across all recorded bids for a given ﬁrm in a given year, we now study
this relationship in the bid-level. This allows us to control for lease-speciﬁc characteristics that could
not as easily be included in the aggregate regressions described above. Controlling for such lease-speciﬁc
characteristics is important in order to start separating two main alternative interpretations of the price-
cash ﬂow sensitivity observed above. Indeed, this sensitivity may reﬂect the fact that cash-rich ﬁrms
tend to bid on higher quality tracts. Alternatively, cash-rich ﬁrms may simply be paying more for tracts
of similar quality. Under the ﬁrst interpretation, one would expect the price-cash ﬂow sensitivity to be
weakened as one controls for lease-speciﬁc characteristics that are correlated with expected productivity.
18This lack of a quantity response could in principle be driven by the speciﬁc nature of this investment project: bidding on
a ﬁxed set of leases. As we discuss in Section 6, however, this is unlikely to be the case. While there are a ﬁxed number of
tracts auctioned oﬀ in any given sale, many tracts go unbought. Expanding on the quantity margin should therefore be quite
feasible.
19Obviously, and as noted earlier, such perceived contradictions rely on taking quite seriously our measurement of “quantity.”
It is possible that the easing of liquidity constraints allows ﬁrms to buy a diﬀerent quality mix of tracts than they otherwise
could and thus there might be no “quantity” response as we measure it. Similarly, a more subtle interpretation of the empire-
building model could be that managers care about increasing scale through an increase in the “quality” of the projects they
undertake. In the analysis below, we will however ﬁnd no evidence that higher cash ﬂow leads ﬁrms to bid on “better” tracts,
either as measured based on the ex-ante characteristics of these tracts or based on their ex-post productivity.
13We focus on all bids in Panel A of Table 6 and on the sub-sample of winning bids in Panel B. The 2
panels follow the same structure, except for the last column of Panel B. All regressions in Table 6 include,
in addition of cash ﬂow, Tobin’s Q, ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Also, standard errors are
estimated accounting for the correlation of the error term at the ﬁrm-level.
As a benchmark, column 1 shows that, absent any tract-level controls, a 1 percent increase in cash ﬂow
increases bid price per acre by between .11 (Panel A) and .16 percent (Panel B). In column 2, we add as a
control the per barrel spot price of oil in the month the tract was auctioned oﬀ.20 Interestingly, there is a
strong positive correlation between oil price at auction time and bid price, with a 1 percent increase in oil
price raising bid price per acre by about .4 percent. The addition of this control however does not aﬀect
the relationship between bid price and cash ﬂow.
In column 3, we further control for a set of tract-level characteristics capturing information that is
available to the bidders at the time of bidding and that is likely to be correlated with the expected
productivity of the tract. First, we control for the size of the lease, which we measure in number of acres.
It is a well-known fact from previous work that larger tracts are on average less likely to be productive
and tend to sell at a lower price (Hendricks and Porter 1996). Second, we control for the minimum and
maximum depth of the tract. Everything else equal, tract depth is likely to be negatively correlated with
expected proﬁts as exploration and extraction costs increase with depth. Finally, also computable by ﬁrms
prior to bidding on a given tract is the observed productivity on previously auctioned oﬀ tracts that are
located in the same geographic area. We compute this area-speciﬁc productivity measure based on the
MMS data. For a given lease located within a given area (referred to as “county” in the MMS data) and
auctioned oﬀ at a given date, we compute the fraction of productive tracts among all the tracts that were
auctioned oﬀ in that area prior to that date.21
As expected, larger tracts sell at a discount. A 1 percent increase in tract size leads to about a .25
percent drop in price. We also ﬁnd (not reported in the table) that lower bids are recorded for deeper
tracts. Also, there is a strong positive correlation between bid price and observed past productivity in a
given area, everything else equal. Most important for our purpose, though, the inclusion of these three
sets of controls has no eﬀect on the estimated price-cash ﬂow sensitivity.
In column 4, we further add controls for lease-speciﬁc contract characteristics. These include dummies
for royalty rate, rental rate and length of the lease. The inclusion of these additional controls some-
20This monthly time series, titled “Spot Oil Price: West Texas Intermediate,” was obtained from Dow Jones Energy Service.
21We prefer this measure to the inclusion of county ﬁxed eﬀects. Indeed, this measure is by deﬁnition only backward-looking
while county eﬀects would be both backward- and forward-looking. We however obtain qualitatively similar results if we
include county ﬁxed eﬀects instead.
14what lowers the point estimate on cash ﬂow. However, the point estimate stays positive and statistically
unchanged.
Columns 5 and 6 respectively replicate columns 1 and 4 but spline the cash ﬂow variable into three
groups, allowing for the price-cash ﬂow sensitivity to diﬀer in the low, medium and high cash ﬂow ranges.
As before, we ﬁnd that the positive association between price and cash ﬂow is concentrated in the medium
cash ﬂow range.
Column 7 replicates column 6 but allows for the bid price-oil price relationship to vary by ﬁrm. The
countervailing hypothesis we mean to test for here is the possibility that the ﬁrms in our sample may be
diﬀerentially aﬀected by variation in the price of oil. For example, a given ﬁrm may have a 100 percent
of its activities in the oil business while another ﬁrm may have a lower fraction of its activities in that
business. One may expect these 2 ﬁrms to respond diﬀerentially to a given increase in the price of oil. By
allowing for interaction between the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and oil price, we account for such possible diﬀerences
across ﬁrms. As the ﬁndings in column 7 indicate, though, the inclusion of these additional controls leaves
the estimated relationship between bid price and cash ﬂow economically and statistically unchanged.
Finally, we assess the robustness of our results to controlling for another tract characteristic that is
likely to be even more informative about expected tract quality than the physical characteristics discussed
above: the bid placed by the next highest bidder. In the last column of Panel B, we replicate columm 6
of that panel but further control for the logarithm of the second highest bid on that lease, when such a
second highest bid exists. If no second bid exists, we assume the logarithm of the second highest bid to
be zero; of course, we also include a dummy variable to identify these sole bidder auctions. As might have
been expected, the second highest bid is very predictive of the winning bid, everything else equal. But
its inclusion does not statistically signiﬁcantly alter the bid price to cash ﬂow sensitivity. In other words,
when cash ﬂow rises, bidders are not only bidding more per acre for observationally equivalent tracts, they
are also bidding more relative the next highest bidder.
As we have shown above, controlling for tract characteristics does not eliminate the cash ﬂow to bid
price relationship. An alternative way to approach the issues discussed in Table 6 is to ask whether cash-
rich ﬁrms are systematically bidding on diﬀerent kinds of tracts. Table 7 follows this alternative approach
by directly relating tract-level characteristics to ﬁrm-level cash ﬂow. All regressions in Table 7 control
for Tobin’s Q, ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects. We also include the monthly price of oil in even columns and
interactions between ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and the monthly price of oil in odd columns. As in all tables,
standard errors are computed allowing for clustering of the error term at the ﬁrm level.
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is tract size (measured in number acres). We see that
15cash-rich ﬁrms do not systematically bid on smaller tracts, which are expected to be of higher quality.
In columns 3 and 4, we ask whether cash-rich ﬁrms are more likely to bid on tracts located in counties
where they already have a strong presence. If this were true, one might argue that these ﬁrms may have
lower exploration and/or extraction costs, which may justify the higher bids. For a given ﬁrm bidding at
a given date on a given tract located in a given county, we construct based on the MMS data the number
of leases won by that ﬁrm in that county prior to that date. We also control in these regressions for the
total number of leases auctioned oﬀ in that county prior to that date. We do not ﬁnd systematic evidence
for cash-rich ﬁrms bidding more systematically in areas where they are already engaged in more activity.
In columns 5 and 6, we ask whether cash-rich ﬁrms bid more systematically on tracts located in areas
where higher success rates have been recorded in the past. We ﬁnd no evidence for this. In fact, the point
estimate on cash ﬂow in these regressions is negative (even though statistically insigniﬁcant).
The dependent variable in columns 7 and 8 is the number of separate bids recorded for that tract. Our
goal here is to examine whether cash-rich ﬁrms are engaging in more diﬀerentiating behavior by bidding
on tracts that other ﬁrms are less likely to target. Interestingly, we ﬁnd the exact opposite. When ﬁrms
are cash rich, they are more likely to bid on tracts that other ﬁrms are also targeting. While we cannot
provide a deﬁnitive interpretation for this ﬁnding, one conjecture is that this reﬂects a higher reliance on
public information. Managers at cash-rich ﬁrms may spend less time trying to acquire private information
about the leases to be auctioned oﬀ (possibly for agency reasons) and instead herd on the behavior of other
bidders.22
Finally, in columns 9 and 10, we examine whether cash-rich ﬁrms systematically bid on tracts that
other ﬁrms are willing to pay more for. Focusing on the sub-sample of leases that attracted more than one
bid (which we know to be a selected sample from our ﬁndings in columns 7 and 8), we regress the second
highest bid for that tract on the winning ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow. We ﬁnd no relationship.
In summary, these results suggest that cash-rich ﬁrms pay more for leases that appear equivalent on
a set of publicly observable quality dimensions. In addition, the fact that cash-rich ﬁrms are more likely
to bid on leases that attract other bidders is a priori hard to reconcile with the idea that these ﬁrms are
relying more on private information to guide their bidding behavior. However, these facts per se are not
enough to say anything conclusive about how cash ﬂow relates to the eventual productivity of these leases.
It may still be that the leases bid on when cash ﬂow is high are intrinsically better along some unobservable
dimensions. Alternatively, even if these leases are not intrinsically better, perhaps positive shocks to cash
22An increased reliance of public information need not be a violation of proﬁt maximization if tracts attracting a lot of
bidders are also on average more productive. The deﬁnitive test will come from assessing the eventual productivity of the
tracts bought when cash ﬂow is high.
16ﬂow are associated with a higher intrinsic “ability” to ﬁnd oil. The true test of whether the increased
expenditures reﬂect proﬁtable investments or dissipated cash can only come from directly looking at the
productivity of these tracts. This is the question we now turn to.
5.4 Tract-Level Productivity and Cash Flow
As we discussed above, included in the MMS data is an indicator for whether or not a given tract ended
up being declared productive before the lease expiration date.23 In Table 8, we relate this productivity
variable to bid price and cash ﬂow.24
In column 1, we regress a dummy variable for whether the tract was found productive on bid price per
acre, ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects.25 We ﬁnd that a higher bid price per acre is predictive of the eventual
productivity of a tract. This is a well-known fact in this literature. A 1 percent increase in bid price acre
increases the likelihood that the lease will be productive by about .09 percentage points.
Column 2 of Table 8 presents the IV equivalent of the OLS regression in column 1. More precisely, we
instrument bid price per acre with cash ﬂow at the time of the bid, using the splined speciﬁcation described
above. This IV regression allows us to ask whether cash ﬂow driven increases in bid price per acre are also
positively related to tract productivity. We ﬁnd no evidence for this. The point estimate on bid price in
column 2 is in fact negative and marginally signiﬁcant (p = .097). A 1 percent increase in bid price per
acre due to a positive shock to cash ﬂow reduces the likelihood that the tract will be productive by about
.13 percentage points. Column 3 presents the reduced form regression equivalent to the IV regression in
column 2. This reduced form regression shows that it is in the medium cash ﬂow range that positive
shocks to cash ﬂow are associated with lower productivity. There is no relationship between cash ﬂow and
productivity in the bottom and top cash ﬂow ranges.
The remaining columns of Table 8 assess the robustness of these ﬁrst results to controlling for additional
lease- and ﬁrm-level characteristics. OLS regressions are in even columns; IV regressions are in odd columns.
In columns 4 and 5, we add a control for the price of oil in the month the lease was auctioned oﬀ. Columns
6 and 7 further control for tract-level characteristics (minimum and maximum depths of the tract, size of
23More speciﬁcally, the MMS data include a variable called “lease qualifying date,” which is deﬁned as the day, month, and
year that a lease is determined capable of production in paying quantities as established by the Minerals Management Service.
We deﬁne as “non-productive” those leases that do not have a lease qualifying date.
24An alternative approach would be to explicitly calculate a tract level ex post return on investment as in Hendricks, Porter
and Boudreau (1987). We chose against this strategy since we are primarily interested in how this return varies with ﬁrm
cash ﬂow and not with the level of that return. For that purpose, our binary variable (and the output data used below for the
subset of productive tracts) should capture much of the variation. This is especially true since the costs of exploration and
extraction that would have to be used to generate such a return calculation depend mostly on observable tract and timing
characteristics that we can directly control for.
25We estimate a linear probability model. Similar results are found using tobit or probit models instead.
17tract). Finally, columns 8 and 9 further add to the list of controls contract characteristics (dummies for
royalty rate, rental rate and length of lease) and Tobin’s Q.
The OLS and IV estimates of the coeﬃcient on bid price per acre are remarkably stable across all these
diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Interestingly, bid price per acre is still a strong positive predictor of productivity
even after the addition of all of these controls. This indicates that there is residual information in the
price data and thus further reinforces the need to perform the productivity-cash ﬂow sensitivity analysis
reported in this table. Indeed, the positive price-cash ﬂow sensitivity observed earlier may in part reﬂect
some private information cash rich ﬁrms have about tract quality. The IV results in this table show no
evidence that this is the case.
In summary, the average probability of ﬁnding mineral resources in a tract does not increase, and in
fact might well decrease, with cash ﬂow. Recall from Section 4 that this could in principle happen under
all three interpretations of the investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity if there are scale eﬀects. Indeed, proﬁt
maximization only implies that
∂p∗N
∂CF = pCF ∗ N + NCF ∗ p > 0. However, we have seen earlier that there
is no quantity response to cash ﬂow, i.e. NCF ≈ 0. If NCF ≈ 0, then proﬁt maximization must imply that
pCF > 0, which we ﬁnd no evidence for in the data. Thus, we view this combined set of results to be in
contradiction with proﬁt maximization. Put simply, our results so far state that ﬁrms, when cash rich: (i)
spend more in buying tracts, (ii) do not buy more tracts and (iii) buy tracts that are not more productive
on average.
5.5 Number of Productive Tracts and Cash Flow
A more direct way to test for a violation of proﬁt maximization is to estimate the relationship between
cash ﬂow and the total number of productive tracts (rather than average productivity). In Table 9, we
investigate how p∗N varies with cash ﬂow. We regress the total number of productive exploration projects
on ﬁrm cash ﬂow in the year these projects were undertaken.26 In the ﬁrst 2 columns of Table 9, we simply
sum all productive leases undertaken. In the last 4 columns, we weight each lease by the ﬁrm’s fraction
of ownership in this lease. Columns 1 and 3 estimate a linear regression model; columns 2 and 4 estimate
a splined regression model. Each regression includes Tobin’s Q, ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Standard errors are computed allowing for clustering of the error term at the ﬁrm level.
While we know from Table 4 that total spending increases with cash ﬂow, we ﬁnd no evidence that
total revenue (as proxied by the number of productive tracts) increases with cash ﬂow. In fact, the point
estimate on cash ﬂow is negative, but not statistically signiﬁcant (columns 1 and 3). When we replace the
26So, for example, the cash ﬂow for 1985 is associated with the eventual productivity of all tracts bid on in 1985.
18linear model with a splined speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that the negative correlation is again concentrated in the
middle cash ﬂow range.
5.6 Total Resources Found in Productive Tracts and Cash Flow
In both the theoretical framework and the empirical work so far, we have assumed that the quantity
of minerals found in productive tracts does not systematically change with cash ﬂow. Is this a realistic
assumption? One could imagine that cash-rich ﬁrms bid on leases that are riskier: less likely to found
productive on average, but bigger amounts found when the tract is productive. To analyze this question,
we turn in Table 10 to lease-level production data.
We could only obtain such production data for leases auctioned from 1978 on. For each of these
productive leases, we measure reported gas production (columns 1 to 4) and oil production (columns 5 to
8). In Table 10, we regress the logarithms of these production ﬁgures on bid price and cash ﬂow, controlling
for year and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, as before. The regressions also include a control for price of oil in the month
the lease was auctioned oﬀ (columns 1, 2, 5 and 6) or interactions between the price of oil and ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects (columns 3, 4, 7 and 8). Finally, since production on the leases in this sample started at diﬀerent
points in time, one must also account for the length of time since production started. We implement this
by including dummy variables for the number of months a tract has been under production.
Two interesting results emerge from Table 10. First, for both gas and oil outputs, bid price is an
economically small and statistically insigniﬁcant predictor of actual production amount (columns 1, 3, 5
and 7). The point estimates on bid price are in fact negative in all these regressions. In other words, while
bid price predicts whether a given tract will be productive, it does not predict the amount of minerals found
conditional on productivity. This is consistent with previous ﬁndings and suggests that bidders are not
able to accurately predict the amount of resources under the ground.27 Second, cash ﬂow does not predict
amount of gas found. The coeﬃcients are small and insigniﬁcant (columns 2 and 4). For oil production,
the estimated coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow is negative in both columns 6 and 8 and statistically signiﬁcant in
column 6. This is quite the opposite of the risk-return explanation outlined at the beginning of this section
as an alternative interpretation for our ﬁndings.
27Geologically, the total amount of minerals found depends on the depth of the well below the ground as well as its topology
well below the earth, both of which being hard to measure before exploration.
195.7 Results Over Time
These results as a whole are suggestive of an agency problem for the oil industry. Yet our data stretches a
wide period: 1963 to 1999. During this time period, numerous commentators have argued that governance
has improved in this industry. Speciﬁcally, the takeover wave of the 1980s is purported to have led to
tighter governance. This naturally leads one to ask whether our ﬁndings vary over time. To answer this
question, we pick a rather arbitrary cutoﬀ date (1985) and re-examine our main ﬁndings before and after
this cutoﬀ.28 It is obviously worth noting that many other factors besides governance may have changed
across these two time periods (such as technology for example). In this regard, we view these regressions
as mainly descriptive, and certainly not causal.
We ﬁrst examine whether and how the bidding results of Tables 6 change before and after 1985. As
Table 11 indicates, there is a remarkable congruence across the two time periods. By this metric, at least,
governance has not improved: cash ﬂow still strongly predicts bid price. In Table 12, we examine whether
and how the productivity results of Table 8 change before and after 1985. The ﬁndings in this table, while
somewhat noisy, do appear to suggest some contrasting patterns across the two time periods. Speciﬁcally,
the negative productivity ﬁndings are concentrated in the pre-1985 period. These ﬁndings as a whole
suggest that ﬁrms bidding on these leases may have altered their behavior after the mid-1980s, in a way
that is consistent with more proﬁt maximization, and possibly due to improvement in governance.
6 Interpretation
6.1 Confounds
Our ﬁndings in Section 5, interpreted through the simple framework of Section 4, support a free cash ﬂow
interpretation of the investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity in this industrial setting. The framework proposed in
Section 4 was however quite stylized. One may therefore ask whether any complications to that framework
may alter the current interpretation of our ﬁndings. We consider three potential complications. First,
we discuss the possible impact of introducing imperfect competition (or collusion) amongst bidders. Sec-
ond, we consider complications to the ﬁrm’s objective function. Finally, we consider whether managerial
overconﬁdence might better ﬁt our ﬁndings.
The stylized framework in Section 4 abstracts from the details of the bidding process. This is valid as
long as a bidder’s cash ﬂow does not aﬀect this bidding process, which would be the case if each auction
had numerous competing bidders. But, as we discussed in Section 2, most of the auctions in our data
28Very similar results follow if we choose any other date in the 1980s as the cutoﬀ.
20have very few bidders, which is why ﬁrms win roughly 7
9 of all tracts they place bids on.29 Could collusive
bidding explain our ﬁndings? It would be possible to rationalize that higher cash ﬂow gives a ﬁrm a greater
ﬁnancial incentive to deviate from a collusive equilibrium. For example, cash rich ﬁrms may be in a position
where they have a higher chance to win a bidding war with their competitors. This could explain one of our
results, i.e. the rise in bid price when cash ﬂow increases (Table 6). This could also explain the fact that
high cash ﬂow ﬁrms are more likely to bid on tracts that receive other independent bids (Table 7). Yet, if
a ﬁrm is rationally deviating from a collusive equilibrium, it should do so to increase its proﬁts. We have
found, however, that the marginal tract bought when cash ﬂow increases is not more productive (Table 8).
We ﬁnd this last ﬁnding much harder to reconcile with a rational collusion breakdown explanation.
Our stylized framework also assumes that tract returns are independent, meaning that the productivity
of a tract completely captures the returns to investing in it. Yet interdependencies between tracts can
potentially exist. Firms may learn from their success (or not) on one tract what other tracts to bid on
(or not to bid on). This could potentially explain our productivity results if high cash ﬂow leads ﬁrms
to experiment more, for example by bidding on tracts further away from the areas they know best. The
higher failure rate on such tracts may be oﬀset by the higher proﬁts they experience on future bids once
they have identiﬁed new productive areas. This interpretation, while ﬁtting some of our basic facts, does
not ﬁt several others. First, recall that in Table 7, we examined the relationship between a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow
and the characteristics of the tracts this ﬁrm bids on. There (columns 3 and 4), we found no systematic
cash ﬂow and number of neighboring tracts (to the tract bid on) that are owned by the ﬁrm. Second,
this interpretation suggests that higher cash ﬂow today should be predictive of higher productivity among
tracts bought in later years. We formally tested the idea. Speciﬁcally, we replicated the reduced form
speciﬁcations of Table 8 using as a dependent variable the productivity of tracts bought in year t+5 (while
cash ﬂow was still measured in year t). We found no systematic relationship between tract productivity
and cash ﬂow in this case.30 This suggests that experimentation and between-tract externalities could not
easily explain our results.
Finally, might managerial overconﬁdence help explain our pattern of ﬁndings?31 Perhaps high cash ﬂow
induces managers to be overconﬁdent about their abilities to ﬁnd the right tract of land, causing them to
29Allegations of bidder collusion are sometimes made about oil and gas lease bidding. See for example Bajari and Summers
(2002) for an empirical discussion of collusion in such auctions.
30For example, a replication of column 3 of Table 8 led to the following coeﬃcients (and standard errors) on the cash ﬂow
variables: cash ﬂow-spline 1: -.008 (.022); cash ﬂow-spline 2: -.013 (.068); cash ﬂow-spline 3: -.056 (.060). Note also that we
found no signiﬁcant relationship between bid price and cash ﬂow under this alternative lag structure. In other words cash ﬂow
in year t does not predict bid price per acre in year t + 5.
31Kahneman and Lavallo (1993) provide a useful psychological perspective on overconﬁdence. Roll (1986), Heaton (2002),
Hackbarth (2003) and Malmendier and Tate (forthcoming) provide some discussions and evidence within the ﬁeld of corporate
ﬁnance.
21bid more on tracts that end up not being more productive.32 It is unclear under this explanation, however,
why managers do not bid on more tracts or buy more tracts. If they felt a greater ability to pick winners,
would they not take advantage of this ability by buying more tracts or expanding in some way the scale of
operations? The lack of a quantity response, we believe, makes the overconﬁdence story less plausible in
this setting.
Thus, while the framework we propose in Section 4 is quite stylized, the complications discussed above
do not clearly lead us to alter the interpretation of our ﬁndings. We believe that these ﬁndings are
best explained by a “quiet life” agency model: managers use cash to make their work easier, outbidding
competitors on tracts they are also vying for rather than looking hard to ﬁnd productive tracts that others
are not bidding on. While a more detailed quiet life model is hard to test without greater organizational
data, we can speculate about what one might look like. When cash ﬂow rises, top management may
increase budgets throughout the organization or be more lenient with budgetary requests. This in turn
gives lower-level managers greater slack. In an empire-building model, these lower-level managers may use
that slack to buy more tracts and expand the scale of operations. In a quiet life model, they may use that
slack to save on their private costs of eﬀort. For example, instead of engaging in eﬀort to discover which
tracts look more attractive, they may instead pick tracts that are publicly thought to be attractive and
outbid their competition on these tracts. Instead of risking the chance of failure (and hence of having to
start the search process again), they may overpay to ensure that they win a given auction. The key feature
of this model is that managers’ goal is to reduce eﬀortful activities.
6.2 Generalization
Can these results generalize to other industries or to the economy as a whole? Of course, every industry
has its own features so it is unlikely that any single industry study could be used to paint a “general”
picture. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd it useful to highlight a few distinctive features of the oil bidding process.
This may in turn help predicting in which other contexts one could expect similar results.
A ﬁrst important feature, which we have just discussed, is that lower-level managers make most of the
speciﬁc investment decisions in this context. Except at smaller ﬁrms, top management is not involved in
the details of the exploration and bidding activities.33 Thus our results may more likely generalize to other
investment decisions decided upon lower in the corporate hierarchy rather to ones (such as acquisitions or
32Of course, one could also have said that overconﬁdence should lead them to bid less since they might also be overconﬁdent
about their probability of winning.
33Though, of course, top management may set the overall budget for these divisions.
22mergers) decided upon at the top of the hierarchy.34
The lack of a quantity response is important to the “quiet life” interpretation we have proposed for
our ﬁndings. Could this be driven by the limited number of tracts that go for sale in every period? At
the extreme, one could imagine that this indeed contributes to the lack of a quantity response: it is harder
to expand the number of tracts explored if the aggregate number of tracts for sale is capped. In practice,
though, this is unlikely to be a binding constraint since a large fraction of tracts go unbought in every
single sale. In other words, bidders could easily expand the scale of their operations by bidding on more
tracts, many of which would not be bid on and go unsold.35 Also, it is important to note that aggregate
scale constraint is a feature of investment in many other industries; it is simply more transparent here
because of the bidding process. Aggregate demand or limited resources (e.g. natural or land) all could
contribute to a similar constraint on the number of investment projects in other industries.
Finally, this is a remarkably cash rich industry. Everything else equal, liquidity constraints are therefore
likely to be less important here than in other settings. While this does not undercut the evidence we have
presented, it does leave open the possibility that liquidity constraints may play a more central role in other
industrial sectors.
7 Conclusion
As a whole, our ﬁndings in this paper appear to support a free cash ﬂow model of the investment-cash
ﬂow sensitivity in the oil industry, with ﬁrms spending more on investment projects when cash ﬂow is high
but not generating additional revenues from this additional spending. The speciﬁc form of the additional
spending (through a price margin rather than a quantity margin, and by bidding more systematically on
tracts that have also been identiﬁed and targeted by other bidders) is most consistent with a version of the
free cash ﬂow model where richer managers prefer to lead a “quiet life” rather than to build “empires.” We
conjecture that the “quiet life” behavior exhibited in this industry takes the form of lower-level managers
expanding less personal eﬀort in screening which tracts to bid on when their budget increases (because
of higher cash ﬂow), and instead using cash to outbid competitors on tracts for which there is greater
public information. Obviously, further testing of this speciﬁc corporate response to higher cash ﬂow would
require much ﬁner information on the speciﬁc allocation of resources and responsibilities within ﬁrms. Such
detailed internal budgeting and organizational data is unfortunately not widely available at this point in
34See Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003, however, for evidence on “quiet life”-type behavior even for large investment decisions
likely made at the top of a hierarchy.
35One could in principle argue that the number of “quality” tracts is capped, something we have no way of evaluating.
23time.
Finally, our results also suggest some behavioral changes over time. These changes are consistent with
investment decisions being more in line with proﬁt maximization after the mid-1980s, a period over which
numerous observers suggested that corporate governance in the oil industry improved.
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26Table I: Bid-Level Summary Statistics
a
Sample: All Bids Winning Bids
Bid price per acre 1753.738 1822.439
(5516.353) (6219.530)
Log (bid price per acre) 5.532 5.384
(1.889) (1.907)
Tract size (in acres) 5211.089 5224.442
(941.939) (995.343)
Productive? (Y=1) .306 .240
(.461) (.427)
Log (total assets) 9.083 9.191
(1.689) (1.654)
Log (cash ﬂow) -1.610 -1.635
(.423) (.415)
Lagged Tobin’s Q 1.166 1.176
(.561) (.600)
Sample size 24363 16410
aNotes:
1. The unit of observation is a bid (placed by a given company on a given lease). This table presents
summary statistics for bid, tract and ﬁrm-level characteristics. The sample in column 2 is all bids
placed between 1963 and 1999 by companies (or subsidiaries of companies) covered in COMPUSTAT.
The sample in column 3 is all winning bids placed between 1963 and 1999 by companies (or subsidiaries
of companies) covered in COMPUSTAT. Sample sizes reported at the bottom of columns 2 and 3 are
maximum sample sizes: not all variables are available for each observation. Data sources: Mineral
Management Services and COMPUSTAT (see Section 3 for details).
2. All dollar ﬁgures are deﬂated using the CPI (base year is 2000).Table II: Firm-Level Capital Expenditures,
Cash Flow and Bidding
a
Panel A: Total Capital Expenditures-Cash Flow Correlation
Dep. var.: Total Capital Expenditures
All Years All Years Bidding Years Winning Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash ﬂow .448 .421 .369 .366
(.046) (.046) (.069) (.070)
Tobin’s Q .141 .070 .072
(.048) (.032) (.035)
Year F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 2298 2298 1017 960
Adjusted R
2 .51 .51 .59 .58
Panel B: Bidding-Total Capital Expenditures Correlation
Dep. Var.: Prob. Bidding Prob. Winning Amount Bid Amount Won
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital expenditures .047 .044 .515 .458
(.017) (.016) (.118) (.112)
Year F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 2418 2418 1041 980
Adjusted R
2 .51 .53 .70 .64
aNotes:
1. Panel A presents regressions of total capital expenditures on cash ﬂow at the ﬁrm level. Panel B
presents regressions of bidding probabilities, winning probabilities and total amount bid and won at
the ﬁrm level. The ﬁrms included in the sample are those COMPUSTAT ﬁrms that have placed at
least one bid in the MMS data between 1963 and 1999. Observations for these ﬁrms are included for
all years in columns 1 and 2, only bidding years in column 3 and only winning years in column 4.
Data sources: Mineral Management Services and COMPUSTAT (see Section 3 for details).
2. Total capital expenditures, cash ﬂow, amount bid and amount won are all deﬂated by net property,
plant and equipment at the beginning of the ﬁscal year. All are expressed in logarithms.
3. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the error term at the ﬁrm-level.Table III: Predicted Eﬀect of Cash Flow:
Diﬀerent Theoretical Models
VARIABLE
Bid Price Quantity Success Probability Proﬁts
Average Total Average Total Average Total
I N ∗ I N p N ∗ p π Π
MODEL
? + + - + - +
Credit Diminishing
Constraints Returns (DR) π-Max. DR π-Max.
? + + ? + ? +
Mis- DR and DR and
Measurement Quality ↑ π-Max. Quality ↑ π-Max.
? + ? - - - -
Free DR and DR and
Cash Flow Agency Agency Agency AgencyTable IV: Firm Level Biddinga
Dep. Var: Amount Bid Amount Won
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash ﬂow .383 .381
(.129) (.132)
Cash ﬂow-spline 1 .084 .007
(.159) (.155)
Cash ﬂow-spline 2 .898 1.04
(.346) (.370)
cash ﬂow-spline 3 .579 .634
(.379) (.393)
Tobin’s Q .029 -.01 .060 .006
(.089) (.102) (.072) (.093)
Year F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 1031 1031 973 973
Adjusted R2 .69 .69 .636 .639
aNotes:
1. The table presents regressions of total amount bid and total amount won on cash ﬂow at the ﬁrm
level. The ﬁrms included in the sample are those COMPUSTAT ﬁrms that have placed at least one
bid in the MMS data between 1963 and 1999. Observations for these ﬁrms are included only for
bidding years in columns 1 and 2, and only for winning years in columns 3 and 4. Data sources:
Mineral Management Services and COMPUSTAT (see Section 3 for details).
2. Cash ﬂow, amount bid and amount won are all deﬂated by net property, plant and equipment at
the beginning of the ﬁscal year. All are expressed in logarithms. We use a linear spline of the
cash ﬂow variable in columns 2 and 4. “Cash ﬂow-spline 1”, “cash ﬂow-spline 2,” and “cash ﬂow-
spline 3” respectively correspond to the 1ow cash ﬂow levels (below the 33rd percentile of the cash
ﬂow distribution), the medium cash ﬂow levels (between 33rd and 66th percentile of the cash ﬂow
distribution) and the high cash ﬂow levels (above 66th percentile of the cash ﬂow distribution).
3. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the error term at the ﬁrm-level.Table V: Price versus Quantity
Firm Level Dataa
Panel A: Price Eﬀect
Dep. Var.: Amount Bid/ Amount Won/
Number of Tracts Bid On Number of Tracts Won
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash ﬂow .300 .336
(.085) (.087)
Cash ﬂow-spline 1 -.129 -.136
(.104) (.114)
Cash ﬂow-spline 2 .901 .993
(.229) (.246)
Cash ﬂow-pline 3 .810 .985
(.226) (.253)
Tobin’s Q .069 -.008 .053 -.048
(.055) (.059) (.051) (.0549)
Year F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 1031 1031 973 973
Adjusted R2 .858 .862 .856 .836
aNotes:
1. Panel A presents regressions of total amount bid (total amount won) per bid on (won) tract on cash
ﬂow at the ﬁrm level. The ﬁrms included in the sample are those COMPUSTAT ﬁrms that have
placed at least one bid in the MMS data between 1963 and 1999. Observations for these ﬁrms are
included only for bidding years in columns 1 and 2, and only for winning years in columns 3 and 4.
Data sources: Mineral Management Services and COMPUSTAT (see Section 3 for details).
2. Cash ﬂow, amount bid and amount won are deﬂated by net property, plant and equipment at the
beginning of the ﬁscal year. Cash ﬂow, amount bid number of tracts bid on, amount won, number
of tracts won, number of tracts bid on and number of tracts won are all expressed in logarithms.
We use a linear spline of the cash ﬂow variable in columns 2 and 4. “Cash ﬂow-spline 1”, “cash
ﬂow-spline 2,” and “cash ﬂow-spline 3” respectively correspond to the 1ow cash ﬂow levels (below the
33rd percentile of the cash ﬂow distribution), the medium cash ﬂow levels (between 33rd and 66th
percentile of the cash ﬂow distribution) and the high cash ﬂow levels (above 66th percentile of the
cash ﬂow distribution).
3. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the error term at the ﬁrm-level.Table V (cont.): Price versus Quantity
Firm Level Dataa
Panel B: Quantity Eﬀect
Dep. Var.: Number of Tracts
Bid On Won
Cash ﬂow .083 .044
(.122) (.115)
Cash ﬂow-spline 1 .213 .143
(.139) (.128)
Cash ﬂow-spline 2 -.003 .049
(.297) (.287)
Cash ﬂow-spline 3 -.231 -.351
(.273) (.274)
Tobin’s Q -.039 .002 .007 .054
(.060) (.067) (.048) (.058)
Year F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 1031 1031 973 973
Adjusted R2 .608 .608 .576 .576
aNotes:
1. Panel B presents regressions of number of tracts bid on (won) on cash ﬂow at the ﬁrm level. The
ﬁrms included in the sample are those COMPUSTAT ﬁrms that have placed at least one bid in the
MMS data between 1963 and 1999. Observations for these ﬁrms are included only for bidding years in
columns 1 and 2, and only for winning years in columns 3 and 4. Data sources: Mineral Management
Services and COMPUSTAT (see Section 3 for details).
2. Cash ﬂow, amount bid and amount won are deﬂated by net property, plant and equipment at the
beginning of the ﬁscal year. Cash ﬂow, amount bid number of tracts bid on, amount won, number
of tracts won, number of tracts bid on and number of tracts won are all expressed in logarithms.
We use a linear spline of the cash ﬂow variable in columns 2 and 4. “Cash ﬂow-spline 1”, “cash
ﬂow-spline 2,” and “cash ﬂow-spline 3” respectively correspond to the 1ow cash ﬂow levels (below the
33rd percentile of the cash ﬂow distribution), the medium cash ﬂow levels (between 33rd and 66th
percentile of the cash ﬂow distribution) and the high cash ﬂow levels (above 66th percentile of the
cash ﬂow distribution).
3. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the error term at the ﬁrm-level.Table VI: Tract Level Bids
a
Panel A: All Bids
Dependent Variable: Bid Price Per Acre
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Cash ﬂow .108 .099 .102 .062
(.049) (.049) (.048) (.045)
Cash ﬂow-spline 1 .013 .023 .015
(.060) (.053) (.054)
Cash ﬂow-spline 2 .503 .512 .513
(.210) (.204) (.226)
Cash ﬂow-spline 3 .244 -.117 -.372
(.244) (.191) (.198)
Tobin’s Q -.095 -.102 -.101 -.092 -.118 -.083 -.041
(.044) (.045) (.045) (.044) (.052) (.054) (.05)
Monthly oil price .412 .397 .290 .280
(.102) (.122) (.108) (.107)
County success rate .504 .494 .493 .458
(.11) (.093) (.093) (.095)
Tract size -.254 -.241 -.241 -.240
(.04) (.037) (.037) (.038)
Tract depth? No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Contract characteristics? No No No Yes No Yes Yes
Firm F.E.*
Monthly oil price? No No No No No No Yes
Year F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Size 21340 20972 20188 19184 21340 19184 19184
Adjusted R
2 .700 .701 .710 .717 .700 .717 .725
aNotes:
1. The sample in Panel A are all bids by COMPUSTAT ﬁrms between 1963 and 1999. The sample in
Panel B are all winning bids by COMPUSTAT ﬁrms between 1963 and 1999. Data sources: Mineral
Management Services and COMPUSTAT (see Section 3 for details).
2. Tract depth includes control for the minimum and maximum depth of the tract. Contract charac-
teristics include dummy variables for royalty rate, rental rate and length of lease. Monthly oil price
refers to the price of a barrel of oil in the month the tract was auctioned oﬀ. Country success rate is
deﬁned as the fraction of productive tracts among all the tracts that were auctioned oﬀ in that area
county prior to that tract. “2
nd highest bid” refers to the second highest bid on the tract. It is set
to zero if there are no other bids. “Sole bidder” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there were no
other bids.
Notes continued on next page.Table VI(cont.): Tract Level Bids
a
Panel B: Winning Bids
Dependent Variable: Bid Price Per Acre
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cash ﬂow .159 .154 .159 .117
(.062) (.064) (.059) (.049)
Cash ﬂow-spline 1 .069 .078 .054 .038
(.063) (.057) (.06) (.046)
Cash ﬂow-spline 2 .589 .564 .788 .499
(.245) (.223) (.269) (.209)
Cash ﬂow-spline 3 .280 -.085 -.270 -.093
(.265) (.214) (.248) (.181)
Tobin’s Q -.124 -.137 -.139 -.137 -.148 -.125 -.104 -.115
(.046) (.05) (.047) (.047) (.058) (.058) (.054) (.049)
2




Monthly oil price .178 .242 .140 .131 -.069
(.114) (.154) (.153) (.153) (.146)
County success rate .638 .575 .573 .539 .537
(.166) (.130) (.131) (.133) (.092)
Tract size -.218 -.210 -.210 -.209 -.260
(.041) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.041)
Tract depth? No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Contract characteristics? No No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E.*
Monthly oil price? No No No No No No Yes No
Year F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 14032 13668 13104 12765 14032 12765 12765 12765
Adjusted R
2 .715 .717 .723 .729 .715 .729 .733 .733
aNotes (continued):
3. Cash ﬂow is deﬂated by net property, plant and equipment at the beginning of the ﬁscal year. Bid
price per acre and monthly oil price are expressed in $2000. Tract size is measured in acres. Cash ﬂow,
bid price per acre, tract size, monthly oil price and 2
nd highest bid are all expressed in logarithms.
We use a linear spline of the cash ﬂow variable in columns 5 to 7 (Panel A) and 5 to 8 (Panel B).
“Cash ﬂow-spline 1”, “cash ﬂow-spline 2,” and “cash ﬂow-spline 3” respectively correspond to the
1ow cash ﬂow levels (below the 33rd percentile of the cash ﬂow distribution), the medium cash ﬂow
levels (between 33rd and 66th percentile of the cash ﬂow distribution) and the high cash ﬂow levels
(above 66th percentile of the cash ﬂow distribution).
4. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the error term at the ﬁrm level.Table VII: Tract Level Characteristicsa
Dep. Var.: Tract Size Presence County Number Next
in County Success of Bids Bid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Cash ﬂow .010 .018 .145 .344 -.010 -.011 .163 .149 -.005 .001
(.015) (.015) (.940) (.549) (.013) (.012) (.070) (.061) (.082) (.089)
Tobin’s Q .005 -.001 3.683 2.038 -.022 -.013 -.102 -.070 -.160 -.113
(.006) (.007) (1.381) (.528) (.010) (.010) (.081) (.060) (.111) (.130)
Monthly oil price -.034 1.683 -.029 1.123 1.072
(.028) (1.548) (.036) (.174) (.260)
Firm F.E.*
Monthly oil price? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 20984 20984 20408 20408 20199 20199 20984 20984 3736 3736
Adjusted R2 .060 .066 .519 .576 .285 .298 .317 .321 .707 .715
aNotes:
1. The sample is all bids by COMPUSTAT ﬁrms between 1963 and 1999 in columns 1 to 8 and all winning bids in auctions
where there was a second bidder in columns 9 and 10. Data sources: Mineral Management Services and COMPUSTAT
(see Section 3 for details).
2. “Presence in county” represents the number of tracts previously won by that ﬁrm in that county in prior auctions (we
also control in columns 3 and 4 for the total number of tracts auctioned oﬀ in that county in prior auctions). “County
success” is deﬁned as the fraction of productive tracts among all the tracts that were auctioned oﬀ in that area county
prior to that tract. “Number of bids” is the number of independent bids the tract received. “Next bid” refers to the
second highest bid on the tract. “Monthly oil price” refers to the price of a barrel of oil in the month the tract was
auctioned oﬀ.
3. Cash ﬂow is deﬂated by net property, plant and equipment at the beginning of the ﬁscal year. Tract size is measured
in acres. Cash ﬂow, tract size, next bid and monthly oil price are all expressed in logarithms.
4. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the error term at the ﬁrm level.Table VIII: Tract Level Productivitya
Dependent Variable: Productive Tract? (Y=1)
OLS IV Reduced OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Bid price .088 -.137 .089 -.145 .089 -.126 .088 -.161
per acre (.004) (.082) (.004) (.090) (.004) (.087) (.004) (.115)
Cash ﬂow .013





Monthly oil price .080 .177 .062 .142 .032 .085
(.033) (.049) (.035) (.045) (.039) (.042)
Tobin’s Q -.025 -.041
(.012) (.014)
Tract char’s? No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contract char’s? No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Year F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 21340 21374 21340 20972 20972 20972 20972 19946 19946
Adjusted R2 .298 .256 .294 .302
aNotes:
1. The table presents regressions of tract-level productivity on bid price and cash ﬂow. The sample is all bids by COM-
PUSTAT ﬁrms between 1963 and 1999. The dependent variable in all columns is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the tract was designated as productive before the end of the exploration period. Data sources: Mineral Management
Services and COMPUSTAT (see Section 3 for details).
2. Tract characteristics include tract size, minimum and maximum depth. Contract characteristics include dummy vari-
ables for royalty rate, rental rate and length of lease. Monthly oil price refers to the price of a barrel of oil in the month
the tract was auctioned oﬀ. Cash ﬂow is deﬂated by net property, plant and equipment at the beginning of the ﬁscal
year. Bid price per acre and monthly oil price are expressed in $2000. Tract size is measured in acres. Cash ﬂow, bid
price per acre, tract size, monthly oil price are all expressed in logarithms.
3. We use a linear spline of the cash ﬂow variable as control in the reduced form regression (column 3) and as instrument
for bid price per acre in the IV regressions (columns 2, 5, 7 and 9). “Cash ﬂow-spline 1”, “cash ﬂow-spline 2,” and
“cash ﬂow-spline 3” respectively correspond to the 1ow cash ﬂow levels (below the 33rd percentile of the cash ﬂow
distribution), the medium cash ﬂow levels (between 33rd and 66th percentile of the cash ﬂow distribution) and the high
cash ﬂow levels (above 66th percentile of the cash ﬂow distribution).
4. Standard errors correct for clustering at the ﬁrm level except in the IV regressions.Table IX: Firm Level Productivitya
Dep. Var.: Number of Productive Leases
Unweighted Ownership
Weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash ﬂow -.243 -.219
(.681) (.331)
Cash ﬂow-spline 1 .342 -.128
(.867) (.451)
Cash ﬂow-spline 2 -5.96 -1.99
(4.99) (2.80)
Cash ﬂow-spline 3 .776 .415
(1.50) (.952)
Year F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 1033 1033 1033 1033
Adj. R2 .510 .520 463 .462
aNotes:
1. The table presents regressions of total number of productive leases on cash ﬂow at the ﬁrm level. The
dependent variable is the number of tracts bid on in a given year that ended up being productive.
Cash ﬂow is measured in the year the bids for these tracts were placed. Columns 1 and 2 present
simple counts; columns 3 and 4 present ownership-weighted counts, where ownership is the fraction
of ownership the ﬁrm has in each bid. The ﬁrms included in the sample are those COMPUSTAT
ﬁrms that have placed at least one bid in the MMS data between 1963 and 1999. Observations for
these ﬁrms are included only for bidding years. Data sources: Mineral Management Services and
COMPUSTAT (see Section 3 for details).
2. Cash ﬂow is deﬂated by net property, plant and equipment at the beginning of the ﬁscal year. Cash
ﬂow is expressed in logarithm.
3. We use a linear spline of the cash ﬂow variable in columns 2 and 4. “Cash ﬂow-spline 1”, “cash
ﬂow-spline 2,” and “cash ﬂow-spline 3” respectively correspond to the 1ow cash ﬂow levels (below the
33rd percentile of the cash ﬂow distribution), the medium cash ﬂow levels (between 33rd and 66th
percentile of the cash ﬂow distribution) and the high cash ﬂow levels (above 66th percentile of the
cash ﬂow distribution).
4. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the error term at the ﬁrm-level.Table X: Total Resources Found in Tract a
Dep. Var. : Gas Production Oil Production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bid price -.005 -.024 -.146 -.035
Per acre (.044) (.044) (.228) (.237)
Cash ﬂow .026 -.071 -5.098 -.320
(.16) (.175) (1.967) (1.962)
Monthly oil price -.068 -.162 -2.648 -8.220
(.56) (.832) (3.496) (4.87)
Months producing dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E.* No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Monthly oil price?
Year F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Size 1845 1260 1845 1260 493 316 493 316
Adjusted R2 .367 .374 .365 .372 .428 .473 .528 .671
aNotes:
1. The table presents regressions of tract-level gas and oil production on bid price and cash ﬂow. The
sample is productive tracts bid on by COMPUSTAT ﬁrms since 1978. Data sources: Mineral Man-
agement Services and COMPUSTAT (see Section 3 for details).
2. Monthly oil price refers to the price of a barrel of oil in the month the tract was auctioned oﬀ. Months
producing dummies are dummy variables for the number of months of reported production.
3. Cash ﬂow is deﬂated by net property, plant and equipment at the beginning of the ﬁscal year. Bid
price per acre and monthly oil price are expressed in $2000. Cash ﬂow, bid price per acre, monthly
oil price and production of gas and oil are all expressed in logarithms.
4. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the error term at the ﬁrm level.Table XI: Bidding Before and After 1985
a
Dep. Var.: Bid Price Per Acre
Sample: All Bids Winning Bids
Pre-85 Post-85 Pre-85 Post-85
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash ﬂow-spline 1 -.128 .037 -.133 .061
(.103) (.06) (.174) (.065)
Cash ﬂow-spline 2 .618 .591 .884 .765
(.307) (.339) (.41) (.356)
Cash ﬂow-spline 3 -.163 -.277 -.038 -.213
(.208) (.244) (.282) (.266)
Year F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 8848 10336 5106 7659
Adj. R
2 .398 .177 .453 .197
aNotes:
1. This table replicates the regressions in column 5 of Table 6 (Panels A and B) but breaks down the
sample into pre and post 1985. See notes to that table for details.Table XII: Productivity Before and After 1985
a
Dep. Var.: Productive Tract? (Y=1)
Pre-85 Post-85
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bid price .104 -.149 .061 .109
per acre (.004) (.221) (.006) (.123)
Monthly oil Price .256 .448 -.106 -.103
(.069) (.182) (.037) (.041)
Contract characteristics? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract characteristics? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E.? Yes Yes Yes Yes




1. This table replicates the regressions in columns 8 and 9 of Table 8 but breaks down the sample into
pre and post 1985. See notes to that table for details.